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RACE TO JURISDICTION: FORUM DETERMINATION IN
DV-RELATED CHILD CUSTODY ACTIONS WHEN
SURVIVORS FLEE ACROSS RESERVATION LINES
Joy Barber*
I. INTRODUCTION
You are a state district court judge in a small town just outside an
Indian reservation. Before you is a dissolution petition with a parenting plan
brought by the mother of two children. All three are tribal members. The
family has primarily lived on the reservation for the previous four years.
However, after being severely beaten by her non-Indian husband, the
mother has fled to her father’s home, which is located in your small town.
She and the children have resided off reservation for roughly five months.
She states in her petition that she thinks her husband may have also filed for
dissolution and a parenting plan in tribal court. You are concerned about her
safety and the best interests of the children, but you also wonder about this
potential parallel tribal court action.1 Should you find subject matter juris-
diction and proceed with the case?
Child custody actions can be a crucial legal aspect of domestic vio-
lence litigation, the adjudication of which has important safety implications
for survivors. Harm to children, threatened harm to children, specific
parenting plan provisions, and ongoing legal battles over custody can be
elements of an abuser’s power and control, as can the forum selection for
such litigation when it perpetuates survivor contact with a jurisdiction from
which she may have fled for her safety and in order to escape the abuse.2
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA),3
* J.D., American Indian Law Certificate, Class of 2021, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at
the University of Montana. This piece was originally prepared for Professor Andrew King-Ries in his
Domestic Violence course. I am indebted to him for his suggestions and challenging questions, which
made the work so much stronger. Deep gratitude to Professor Monte Mills, who generously offered his
time, insights, and invaluable suggestions to the revision. Sincere appreciation also to Sean Christensen
for his thoughtful and discerning peer review. And many thanks to my family for their boundless pa-
tience as I “talked law at them” while writing and working through ideas.
1. Hypothetical adapted very loosely from Garcia v. Gutierrez, 217 P.3d 591 (N.M. 2009).
2. Deborah M. Goelman, Shelter from the Storm: Using Jurisdictional Statutes to Protect Victims
of Domestic Violence after the Violence Against Women Act of 2000, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 101,
109–12 (2004).
3. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT (1997) (drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws).
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adopted by Montana and nearly all fifty states,4 and the federal statutory
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)5 include domestic violence-
related emergency jurisdiction exceptions to the standard “home state” anal-
ysis as well as the option for courts to decline jurisdiction as inconvenient
fora.6 Such provisions prioritize the safety of survivors and their children
when fleeing across state lines.7 However, appropriate forum determination
becomes less clear when survivors flee across reservation lines. Because
the location of domestic violence shelters, personal support networks, and
resources for survivors may necessitate such flight, empowering Indian8 do-
mestic violence survivors’ choice of forum for family law matters is a criti-
cal piece of their escape from abuse.
Montana’s adoption of the UCCJEA includes the statutory provision to
treat tribes as states for the purposes of applying the Act.9 Montana has also
adopted the provision requiring recognition of tribal court child custody
orders made “in substantial conformity” with the UCCJEA.10 However, if
tribes have not adopted the UCCJEA into their tribal codes, such conform-
ity may be more difficult to find. The result of ambiguity is often either a
race to “first in time” jurisdiction, state vs. tribal, which contravenes the
very purposes of the UCCJEA and PKPA,11 or a confusing mix of simulta-
neous tribal and state court proceedings. The latter creates delays in resolu-
tion—a circumstance against the best interests of the child.12 Ultimately,
4. Kathleen A. Hogan, Understanding the UCCJEA, 39 SPG FAM. ADVOC. 16, 17 (2017). See
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-7-101 to 40-7-317 (2019) (as amended by 1999 Mont. Laws Ch. 91 (H.B. 24)
to adopt the UCCJEA).
5. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-68) (effective Oct. 2000).
6. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT §§ 204, 207; 28 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1738A(c)(2)(C)(ii), (f)(2).
7. See Goelman, supra note 2, at 132–35. See also Tamara Kuennen, Key Provisions of UCCJA,
PKPA, UCCJEA, & ICWA and Improvements Made by the UCCJEA for Battered Women, BATTERED
WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT: NATIONAL CENTER ON FULL FAITH AND CREDIT (2005), https://perma.cc/
3ZMQ-SY9F (last visited Oct. 1, 2019).
8. “Indian” is used throughout the paper as a legal term, as defined in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3).
9. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-7-135(2) (2019).
10. Id. § 40-7-135(3).
11. See Cmt., UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 101 (“[T]his Act
should be interpreted according to its purposes, which are to: (1) Avoid jurisdictional competition . . . in
matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from state to state
with harmful effects on their well-being; (2) Promote cooperation with the courts of other States to the
end that a custody decree is rendered in that State which can best decide the case in the interest of the
child; (3) Discourage the use of the interstate system for continuing controversies over child cus-
tody. . . .”). See also Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 7(a)(2)–(3),
(c)(1)–(5), 94 Stat. 3568, 3568–3569 (1980) (finding inconsistent laws between jurisdictions contributed
to seizure and concealment of children, as well as excessive litigation and conflicting court orders;
identifying purposes nearly identical to the UCCJEA).
12. See In re S.B.C., 340 P.3d 534, 542 (Mont. 2014) (citing to both the ICWA Guidelines and
Montana case law for the principle that protracted litigation is harmful to children’s best interests).
2
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gaps in state application and tribes’ adoption of the UCCJEA result in nega-
tive outcomes for both tribal sovereignty and survivor autonomy and safety.
Yet, while adoption of the UCCJEA into tribal codes seems likely to
strengthen tribal jurisdiction over domestic violence-related child custody
actions involving tribal members, doing so can also have negative implica-
tions in terms of tribal code colonization and survivor autonomy. Impor-
tantly, adoption of the current UCCJEA into tribal codes may reduce poten-
tial tribal jurisdiction by foregoing a membership-based jurisdictional anal-
ysis—with potential to reach beyond reservation boundaries—in favor of
the strictly geographic analysis emphasized by the UCCJEA and PKPA.13
As an alternative, tribes should consider strengthening jurisdictional protec-
tions for domestic violence survivors and their children by establishing
clearer jurisdictional code provisions. As this Article contends, strength-
ened exercises of tribal jurisdiction over custody actions involving tribal
member children are supported by federal policy, Montana and Supreme
Court case law, and comity principles.
II. SURVIVOR IMPORTANCE: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THE
IMPACTS ON CHILDREN
The careful adjudication of child custody issues is paramount to the
safety of domestic violence survivors.14 Reportedly, “twenty-five to fifty
percent of [all] disputed custody cases involve domestic violence,”15 and
whether these cases are decided with consideration for domestic violence is
central to the empowerment and safety of survivors and the safety and re-
covery of children exposed to domestic violence.
There are specific concerns that come with domestic violence-related
child custody issues. It is not uncommon for abusers to threaten or actually
harm children as a means of influencing and exerting control over their
partners,16 and extended custody litigation is one avenue for abusers to
maintain contact with and continue to harass survivors after survivors have
fled abusive situations.17 Custody proceedings provide abusers with oppor-
13. See Lesley M. Wexler, Tribal Court Jurisdiction in Dissolution-Based Custody Proceedings,
2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 613, 613–14 (2001).
14. The Author uses the term “survivors” as its connotation focuses on empowerment and validates
the survival-based choices being made.
15. Zoe Garvin, The Unintended Consequences of Rebuttable Presumptions to Determine Child
Custody in Domestic Violence Cases, 50 FAM. L. Q. 173 (2016), excerpted in NANCY K.D. LEMON,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW, 355 (5th ed. 2018).
16. See Goelman, supra note 2, at 108–09 (noting that in 40 to 60 percent of cases, domestic
violence abusers also abuse the children in the home).
17. See Peter G. Jaffe, C. Crook & Nicolas Bala, Summary of “Matching Parenting Arrangements
to Child Custody Disputes in Family Violence Cases,” Discussion Paper for Dept. of Justice, Ontario,
Canada (2005), excerpted in NANCY K.D. LEMON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW, 347 (5th ed. 2018).
3
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tunities to gain information about and make contact with survivors, al-
lowing for continued monitoring and, potentially, the means to initiate fur-
ther violence and control.18 Extended litigation may also have the effect of
draining a survivor’s financial resources, contributing to continued eco-
nomic abuse by the abuser, as well as increasing the likelihood of a survivor
returning to the abusive home.19 When custody is shared, communication
regarding parenting and exchanges provides opportunities for continued
stalking and harassment. Exchanges are contact points that may be danger-
ous to a survivor’s safety and confidentiality. Thus, how parenting plans are
decided can also create avenues for an abuser’s on-going exertion of power
and control.20
Additionally, the threatened loss of custody is a tool abusers may use
to keep survivors from leaving.21 Given the propensity of state courts to
grant sole or joint custody to abusers,22 and to sometimes ignore the history
of domestic violence in making custody determinations,23 survivors’ con-
cerns about child custody litigation are well-founded.
Careful adjudication of child custody actions is also key to holistically
addressing domestic violence as a societal and public health issue, as re-
search has shown children exposed to domestic violence experience trauma
that impacts their health and cognitive development.24
These issues are critical enough when considered generally, but they
become acute and emblematic of a larger crisis when Native women are the
partners subject to abuse. The federal government has formally acknowl-
edged the crisis of missing and murdered indigenous women in the United
18. Goelman, supra note 2, at 111.
19. Emmaline Campbell, How Domestic Violence Batterers Use Custody Proceedings in Family
Courts to Abuse Victims, and How Courts Can Put a Stop to It, 24 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 41, 54 (2017).
20. See Jaffe, Crook & Bala, supra note 17, at 346 (noting the continuation of stalking after separa-
tion and that visitation and exchanges provide opportunities for renewed domestic violence abuse). See
also Campbell, supra note 19, at 59 (quoting that 70% of domestic violence victims in an interview
reported abusers used children to stay in victims’ lives).
21. See Goelman, supra note 2, at 109 (“Batterers deliberately use the children as weapons after
separation to punish victims for leaving or to force them to reconcile.”).
22. Campbell, supra note 19, at 58. See also American Bar Association Commission on Domestic
Violence, 10 Myths about Custody and Domestic Violence and How to Counter Them, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION (2006), https://perma.cc/SVU3-8A3M (noting that batterers are more likely to seek sole
custody and are often successful).
23. Joan Zorza & Leora Rosen, Guest Editors’ Introduction to Special Issue of Custody and Do-
mestic Violence, 11(8) VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 983–990 (Aug. 2005), excerpted in NANCY K.D.
LEMON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW, 352 (5th ed. 2018) (citing to New York Family Court study wherein
information about domestic violence had no impact on child custody determinations).
24. David Finkelhor, Heather Turner, Anne Shattuck, Sherry Hamby, and Kristen Kracke, Chil-
dren’s Exposure to Violence, Crime, and Abuse: An Update, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN: NATIONAL
SURVEY OF CHILDREN’S EXPOSURE TO VIOLENCE, Office of Justice Programs (Sept. 2015), https://
perma.cc/KHY8-FR2W.
4
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States,25 specifically noting the impacts on indigenous women and chil-
dren.26 More than half of all Native women have experienced intimate part-
ner violence, and this violence is predominantly perpetrated by non-Indian
partners.27
As to how this violence impacts children, in their Senate Judiciary
Committee testimony supporting reauthorization of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA), the National Congress of American Indians reported
that tribes currently exercising VAWA jurisdiction under the 2013 Act
found that “children have been involved as victims or witnesses in [tribal
member domestic violence] cases nearly 60% of the time.”28 The Depart-
ment of Justice has reported that “American Indian and Alaska Native chil-
dren suffer exposure to violence at rates higher than any other race in the
United States,”29 and, due to exposure to violence, “AI/AN children experi-
ence posttraumatic stress disorder at the same rate [22%] as veterans re-
turning from Iraq and Afghanistan and triple the rate of the general popula-
tion.”30 As a result, the reauthorization of VAWA currently before the Sen-
ate includes provisions to authorize tribal prosecutions for crimes against
children under Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction
(SDVCJ).31 The passage of legislation authorizing SDVCJ and its renewed
25. Savanna’s Act, Pub. L. No. 116-165, 134 Stat. 760 (Oct. 10, 2020); Not Invisible Act, Pub. L.
No. 116-166, 134 Stat. 766 (Oct. 10, 2020); Establishing the Task Force on Missing and Murdered
American Indians and Alaska Natives, Exec. Order No. 13,898, 84 Fed. Reg. 66,059 (Nov. 26, 2019).
The State of Montana also passed legislation in 2019 to create a Missing and Murdered Indigenous
Person taskforce. See Hanna’s Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-2-411 (2019).
26. See Remarks by President Trump at Signing of an Executive Order Establishing the Task Force
on Missing and Murdered American Indians and Alaska Natives, The White House (Nov. 26, 2019),
https://perma.cc/R59F-E868.
27. National Congress of American Indians Policy Research Center, Violence Against American
Indian and Alaska Native Women Research Policy Update, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS
1–2 (Feb. 2018), https://perma.cc/RDK2-LE4J (stating that 55.5% of Native women experience intimate
partner violence and 90% of physical violence experienced by Native women is perpetrated by an inter-
racial intimate partner). See also Violence Against Women Act, H.R. 1620, 117th Cong. § 901(3)
(2021) (“The vast majority of Native victims—96 percent of women and 89 percent of male victims—
report being victimized by a non-Indian.”).
28. Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on the Need to Reauthorize the
Violence Against Women Act, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS 2 (Mar. 20, 2018), https://
perma.cc/WQ2Q-748G.
29. Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on American Indian and Alaska Native Children Ex-
posed to Violence, Ending Violence So Children Can Thrive, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 6 (Nov. 2014),
https://perma.cc/ZRG6-6JEV.
30. Indian Law and Order Commission, A Roadmap for Making Native America Safer: Report to
the President and Congress of the United States, UCLA 151 (May 2015), https://perma.cc/MHW8-
ABQJ, as referenced in the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee report, supra note 29, at 38.
31. Violence Against Women Act, H.R. 1620, 117th Cong. § 903 (2021). See Elizabeth Reese and
Virginia Davis, Overdue Justice: DV Jurisdiction in Indian Country, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORT,
Aug./Sept. 2018, 81, 92–94. See also Neoshia R. Roemer, The Violence Against Women Act of 2018: A
Step in the Right Direction for Indian Children and Federal Indian Law, 66 FED. LAW. 53 (2019).
During their campaign, the Biden-Harris administration indicated support for and commitment to the
5
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support in Congress are strong federal policy signals affirming the acute
need to address such violence in Indian country.
Also important to this discussion is that around half of all Indian chil-
dren have a non-Indian parent.32 This means that domestic violence-related
child custody issues involving tribal member survivors and children fre-
quently invoke questions about state vs. tribal jurisdiction over the proceed-
ings.
Given the general need for careful adjudication of domestic violence-
related child custody matters, and the pointed need for close attention to
domestic violence-related cases involving Indian women and children, un-
certainty and competition around jurisdiction over such child custody ac-
tions is a critical legal gap. When such uncertainty and conflict lead to liti-
gation delays, necessitate appearances in unsafe or physically distant fora,
or increase survivor contact with abusers, it exacerbates the personal, legal,
and financial barriers to fleeing abuse.
Native survivors also have particular concerns when pursuing child
custody orders in state courts: the potential for racial bias and the historic
trauma of previous Indian child removal policies. Thus, custody actions in-
volving Indian children and domestic violence survivors are of enormous
importance to not only the parties themselves but also to tribes. Adjudica-
tion of these matters and the ability of tribes to exercise jurisdiction over
them has implications for tribal sovereignty, for the effective protection of
tribal members from violence, and for tribal cultural preservation and integ-
rity.33
III. SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS: STATE COURT BIAS AND HISTORIC
TRAUMA
Recognizing the long assimilationist history of Indian child removal
from tribes is critical to contextualizing the importance of jurisdictional
questions in tribal member custody actions. Previous assimilation and ter-
mination policies and legislation, including the creation and funding of In-
dian boarding schools, deliberately separated Indian children from their
families and communities to impede cultural preservation, thwart commu-
nity cohesion, and diminish sovereignty.34
expansion of VAWA to specifically address crimes affecting Native women and children. See Biden-
Harris Plan for Tribal Nations, https://perma.cc/86F2-YQ8N (last visited Feb. 15, 2021).
32. Wexler, supra note 13, at 613–14.
33. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49 (1989) (noting the
Indian Child Welfare Act provisions “must . . . be seen as a means of protecting not only the interests of
individual Indian children and families, but also of the tribes themselves.”).
34. See Matthew Fletcher and Wenona Singel, Indian Children and the Federal-Tribal Trust Rela-
tionship, 95 NEB. L. REV. 885, 938–44, 952–55 (2017) (tracing the history of the U.S. government’s
6
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The passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) in 1978 was a
direct response to state court and social services biases in Indian child cus-
tody proceedings that “failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of
Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian
communities and families.”35 To be noted, the ICWA specifically excepts
from its purview custody actions that stem from divorce proceedings or
otherwise do not involve custody termination.36 However, as a statement of
federal policy, in the ICWA the federal government recognized tribes’ sov-
ereign interests in adjudication of proceedings involving Indian children as
an aspect of cultural preservation and tribal integrity. Congressional find-
ings supporting the Act unequivocally state, “[T]here is no resource that is
more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their
children . . . .”37
Yet, despite full faith and credit provisions in federal law,38 many state
courts continue to resist the oversight of tribal courts in domestic relations,
particularly in child custody matters involving a non-Indian parent.39 State
courts may precipitately rely upon historic state jurisdiction over family law
issues.40 State courts may also possess insufficient knowledge about and
exhibit distrust of Indian culture.41
Per the ICWA, federal policy recognizes the “unique values of Indian
culture” and seeks to “promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
removal of Native children from their families as an assimilationist leverage tool since the time of
treaty-making and correlating the rise of state social service removal to the decline of federal boarding
schools).
35. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1901(4)–(5) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-259).
See also About ICWA, NATIONAL INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASSOCIATION, https://perma.cc/Z77A-HKN6;
Elizabeth MacLachlan, Tensions Underlying the Indian Child Welfare Act: Tribal Jurisdiction over
Traditional State Court Family Law Matters, 2018 BYU L. REV. 455, 476 (2018).
36. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1903(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-259).
37. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1901(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-259).
38. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-259). But see Wilson v. Marchington,
127 F.3d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding, “[P]rinciples of comity, not full faith and credit, govern
whether a district court should recognize and enforce tribal court judgment.”) (cert. denied 523 U.S.
1074 (1998)). Generally, the PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(8), includes full faith and credit for “a territory
or possession of the United States,” and the Fourth Circuit has applied this to tribes (See In re Larch, 872
F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1989)); however, the New Mexico Supreme Court disagreed with this application,
citing the PKPA’s silence on and therefore inapplicability to tribes, as opposed to the ICWA or the
VAWA. See Garcia v. Gutierrez, 217 P.3d 591, 604–06 (N.M. 2009) (providing a good overview of the
split opinions on this issue). See also Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition and Enforcement
of Judgments: A Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. REV. 311, 332–33 (2000).
39. Elizabeth MacLachlan, Note, Tensions Underlying the Indian Child Welfare Act: Tribal Juris-
diction over Traditional State Court Family Law Matters, 2018 BYU L. REV. 455, 481–82 (2018).
40. See Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic rela-
tions of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the
United States.”).
41. MacLachlan, supra note 39, at 477–78.
7
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families.”42 Yet, Native Americans can experience white, middle-class bias
in state courts that has resulted in the removal of children and best interests
of the child rulings based on the personal norms of the judiciary.43
Alternately, tribes will “generally believe that the best interest of In-
dian children is to stay within their culture.”44 The interpretation that Indian
children’s best interests fundamentally include connection to their tribes has
also been recognized by the Supreme Court.45 Still, research shows that
“state courts and judges use the Anglo-American standard of psychological
parent theory to determine the child’s best interests” rather than acknowl-
edging tribal norms that may include the extended family.46 Further, “States
have used the best interest of the child standard as ‘good cause’ to retain
jurisdiction over an ICWA matter rather than transferring the case to tribal
court.”47
In fact, some state courts have reasoned that “Congress did not intend
ICWA to apply to cases in which the child is not part of an Indian home or
culture.”48 They have then used their own cultural conceptions of what it
means to be “part of a sufficiently Indian family” to determine that ICWA
did not apply to some Indian child custody cases and that tribal involvement
was unwarranted.49 Such decisions serve to preclude the determination of
tribal membership by tribes—an infringement on core sovereignty inter-
ests.50
Preclusion of tribal court jurisdiction in tribal member-involved child
custody actions can have particularly severe impacts on Indian children and
tribes, especially when it results in children’s dislocation or rupture from
relationships with the tribal community and participation in tribal customs.
In essence, it can be seen as “den[ying] Indian children a right to their
cultural identity.”51
Though the ICWA does not apply to non-termination child custody
proceedings, state court bias in determining children’s best interests has ob-
vious bearing on Indian survivor forum selection for domestic violence-
related child custody actions. As noted in the previous Section, threatened
loss of custody is a key abuser’s tool,52 and such a threat can be com-
42. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1902 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-259).
43. MacLachlan, supra note 39, at 483. See also Garvin, supra note 15 at 358.
44. MacLachlan, supra note 39, at 482.
45. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49–50 n.24 (1989).
46. MacLachlan, supra note 39, at 483.
47. Id. at 483.
48. Id. at 485–86.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 485.
52. See supra notes 20–22.
8
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pounded by a non-Indian parent’s threat of adjudication in a potentially
biased state court. State court bias can impede survivors’ abilities to advo-
cate for child custody arrangements that protect their own and their chil-
dren’s safety, as well as their own and their children’s cultural identity.
State court distances from reservations may impact a survivor’s ability to
easily respond to child custody litigation in these fora. And a survivor’s
access to legal counsel can be impacted by state court differences from a
tribal court system that incorporates the use of lay advocates.53 As noted
above, the jurisdictional scramble also has the potential to drag a survivor
back to a jurisdiction she fled for safety reasons.
As embodied in the principles underpinning the ICWA, tribes’ inter-
ests in cultural preservation and integrity are present in all child custody
actions involving Indian children. Lack of tribal court involvement in these
actions undermines key sovereignty interests, including tribes’ interests in
the safety and welfare of tribal member survivors and children. When im-
plicated, the ability of tribal courts to fully exercise jurisdiction over do-
mestic violence-related child custody actions is both an important aspect of
tribal sovereignty and Indian survivor safety and escape from abuse.
IV. THE UCCJEA’S JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS
Drafted in 1997, the UCCJEA was model legislation meant to resolve
inconsistencies between the prior Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA) of 1968 and the PKPA, a federal act passed in 1980 to curtail
forum hopping, interstate child abduction, and interstate conflicts in child
custody matters.54 While the UCCJA allowed for consideration of “home
state” jurisdiction, the PKPA and the UCCJEA have prioritized this as the
primary analysis for determining initial subject matter jurisdiction over
child custody actions.55 A child’s “home state” is usually where the child
has lived with a parent for six consecutive months preceding the com-
mencement of court action, as long as at least one parent still resides in that
jurisdiction.56 The UCCJEA also provides that tribes are to be treated as
states in a home state analysis and other provisional applications of the
Act.57 Montana has adopted the UCCJEA, including the provision to treat
53. See, e.g., The Judicial Branch of the Crow Nation: Advocate List, https://perma.cc/KN8T-
EQCF.
54. Hogan, supra note 4, at 16–17.
55. See Kuennen, supra note 7. See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-7-201 (2019).
56. Hogan, supra note 4, at 17–18. See § 40-7-103(7). See also Id. § 1-1-215 for Montana’s statu-
tory definition of “residence.”
57. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 104. See also Kelly Stoner and
Richard A. Orona, Full Faith and Credit, Comity, or Federal Mandate? A Path That Leads to Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Tribal Court Orders, Tribal Protection Orders, and Tribal Child Custody
Orders, 34 N.M. L. REV. 381, 403 (2004).
9
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tribes as states and to recognize tribal court orders made in conformity with
the Act.58
The PKPA and UCCJEA also provide for emergency jurisdiction in a
state other than the home state if the child, sibling, or parent have been
subjected to or threatened with abuse.59 Under the UCCJEA, emergency
jurisdiction is usually temporary but can “evolve into home state jurisdic-
tion” when the state with home state jurisdiction declines jurisdiction via an
inconvenient forum analysis.60 Inconvenient forum analysis factors include
determining which state offers the best protection against continued domes-
tic violence and the ongoing health of the parties.61 In Stoneman v. Drol-
linger,62 the Montana Supreme Court thoroughly examined such a declina-
tion in a domestic violence situation via analysis of the factors in Montana
Code Annotated § 40-7-108, finding that the district court had abused its
discretion in denying the survivor’s motion for declination under the
UCCJEA because it had “failed to consider [the survivor’s] safety and well-
being when evaluating . . . transfer of proceedings.”63
Filing for emergency jurisdiction or inconvenient forum analysis also
triggers the judicial communications aspect of UCCJEA,64 a statutory ex-
pectation that the courts will talk to each other. Judges are permitted to
share information regarding any abuse in conversations to determine which
forum is most appropriate for determining the best interests of the child.65
The Commissioners’ Note for the Montana statute emphasizes that expecta-
tions for judicial communications include tribal courts.66 In simultaneous
proceedings, if it is determined an action has previously begun in another
forum, a stay is required, and judicial communication is required, rather
than permissive.67
However, the provisions of the UCCJEA only provide protections for
tribal court actions or deference in a simultaneous proceedings analysis if
58. §§ 40-7-135(2)-(3), 40-7-201.
59. Kuennen, supra note 7. See also § 40-7-204(1).
60. Kuennen, supra note 7.
61. Joan Zorza, The UCCJEA: What Is It and How Does It Affect Battered Women in Child-Cus-
tody Disputes, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 909, 923 (2000).
62. 64 P.3d 997 (Mont. 2003).
63. Id. at 998–99, 1002, 1004–05 (holding the Washington court was the more appropriate forum,
as well as “urg[ing] district courts to give priority to the safety of victims of domestic violence when
considering jurisdictional issues under the UCCJEA”).
64. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 204(d). See also MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-7-204(4) (2019).
65. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 110. See also § 40-7-139 (Com-
missioners’ Note specifically, stating, “This includes communication with foreign tribunals and tribal
courts.”).
66. § 40-7-139.
67. Id. § 40-7-107.
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 82 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol82/iss2/1
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\82-2\MON201.txt unknown Seq: 11 22-SEP-21 14:36
2021 RACE TO JURISDICTION 269
they are “in substantial conformity” with the UCCJEA.68 Lack of conform-
ity with the UCCJEA has been alternately cited to favor tribal jurisdiction
because of the UCCJEA’s inapplicability to tribes,69 as well as to dismiss
tribal jurisdiction in favor of state jurisdiction.70 The jurisdictional analysis
under the PKPA and its full faith and credit protections also requires that
the state making the child custody determination must have jurisdiction
“under its own laws.”71 In application, depending on the scope and clarity
of jurisdictional provisions in tribal codes, these aspects of the UCCJEA
and the PKPA can work against tribal jurisdiction.
V. SCENARIOS
While the UCCJEA and the PKPA provide clear frameworks for juris-
dictional analysis when such scenarios occur between states, their applica-
tion to contested jurisdiction is muddier between state and tribal courts. At
least one Montana practitioner reported72 that such jurisdictional conflicts
do often get decided based on “first in time,” precisely the type of race to
control forum determination that uniform legislation like the UCCJEA was
enacted to prevent. As explored above, such jurisdictional competition also
has tribal sovereignty implications when it precipitously precludes tribal
courts’ opportunities to determine jurisdiction—a contravention of tribal
court exhaustion principles.73
The following scenarios illustrate the potential complexities of tribal
vs. state court subject matter jurisdiction in domestic violence-related child
custody actions involving Indian survivors:
68. Id. §§ 40-7-135(3), 40-7-139(2). See also Duty to Enforce, § 40-7-303(1) and Recognition and
Enforcement, § 40-7-313.
69. See Tupling v. Kruse, 15 Am. Tribal Law 23, 34–36, 2017 WL 2443081 (Colville C.A.) (Bass,
J., dissenting). See also Father J. v. Mother A., 6 Mash.Rep. 297, 2015 WL 5936866 (Mash. Pequot
Tribal Ct. 2015) (finding that the tribe had not adopted the UCCJEA and the tribe had jurisdiction). For
a survey of state cases examining UCCJEA application to tribal courts, see Deborah F. Buckman, Uni-
form Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act’s Application to Tribal Courts, 45 A.L.R. 7TH
ART. 5 (2019).
70. See Billie v. Stier, 141 So. 3d 584 (3d Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-259). See also National Center on
Protection Orders and Full Faith & Credit, Interstate Child Custody: A Practitioner’s Guide to the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT, https://perma.cc/
ZN2F-FVRN (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
72. Telephone Interview with Kathryn Seaton, Indian Law attorney with Montana Legal Services
Association (Nov. 14, 2019).
73. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 855–56 (1985) (“[T]he
existence and extent of a tribal court’s jurisdiction will require a careful examination of tribal sover-
eignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a
detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and
administrative or judicial decisions. We believe that examination should be conducted in the first in-
stance in the Tribal Court itself.”).
11
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1. An Indian parent lives on her74 tribe’s reservation with her non-Indian
partner who is also the parent of her Indian child.75 The relationship in-
volves physical abuse perpetrated by the non-Indian partner upon the Indian
partner. Wishing to escape the abuse, the Indian partner flees with the
couple’s child to the nearest domestic violence shelter, which is located off
reservation, 60 miles away in the nearest metropolitan area.76 The non-In-
dian abuser immediately initiates a child custody action in the nearest state
district court, which happens to be located in a town just off the reservation,
about 50 miles from the shelter where the survivor and child now reside.
2. Alternately, an Indian parent attends college and works in a metropoli-
tan area located about 60 miles from her tribe’s reservation. She lives with
her non-Indian partner and their Indian child, but experiences domestic vio-
lence at the hands of her non-Indian partner. She decides to leave the rela-
tionship and flees to the reservation where her family and support network
are located, taking the child with her. The non-Indian partner immediately
initiates a child custody action in state court in the city where the couple has
been living. Within days of leaving, the Indian parent also files for an order
of protection and begins a child custody action in tribal court.
These scenarios are not uncommon in areas near Indian reservations.77
Under a general application of the UCCJEA, in Scenario 1, where the survi-
vor flees to an off-reservation shelter and the non-Indian abuser files for
child custody in a state court neighboring the reservation, application of the
UCCJEA home state analysis should allow for the survivor to establish
home state jurisdiction in the tribal court, given the entire family’s on-go-
ing, preceding residency on the reservation. However, it is not beyond im-
agination that the state court may determine it has continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction and may dismiss motions to decline jurisdiction under an incon-
venient forum analysis based on a “first in time” analysis and the current
74. The female pronoun is used throughout, as the majority of domestic violence survivors are
women. See Jennifer L. Truman and Rachel E. Morgan, Nonfatal Domestic Violence, 2003–2012, U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE SPECIAL REPORT 1 (Apr. 2014), https://perma.cc/W2QE-H5AA (stating that 76% of
victims of domestic violence are women). However, men also experience domestic violence, and though
these examples involve opposite sex couples, domestic violence occurs in same-sex partnerships as well.
75. As defined in 25 U.S.C.A. § 1903(4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-259).
76. This situation is not unlikely. See Kathryn Ford, Combatting Domestic Violence in Indian
Country: Are Specialized Domestic Violence Courts Part of the Solution?, CENTER FOR COURT INNOVA-
TION 4 (2015), https://perma.cc/6QY8-FL3Y (noting that “[m]any tribal communities are small and geo-
graphically isolated, with limited access to services . . . [and] some specialized services that are readily
accessible in non-tribal communities, such as batterers’ intervention programs, rape crisis services,
trauma-focused mental health care, and domestic violence shelters, may not be available on some reser-
vations.”).
77. These scenarios are anecdotal examples drawn from the Author’s experiences serving as a
Justice for Montanans AmeriCorps member at the Self-Help Law Center in Billings, Montana. Montana
practitioner Hilly McGahan also confirmed these were common scenarios she encountered while work-
ing for the SAFE Harbor Legal Program, which serves Lake County and the Flathead Reservation in
Montana. Interview with Hilly McGahan, Attorney (Mar. 17, 2021).
12
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location of the survivor and the couple’s child off reservation.78 Regretta-
bly, while federal law provides full faith and credit mandates for tribal court
judgments in limited subject matter areas such as domestic violence protec-
tive orders,79 child support orders, and orders pertaining to child custody,
some states continue to resist tribal court oversight, “The most troubling
result of this unfettered lack of compliance [being] that . . . [nearly all]
instances of non-recognition involved orders that lie at the very heart of a
tribe’s ability to regulate domestic relations . . . .”80
In Scenario 2, where the survivor flees onto the reservation to escape
her abuser, a home state analysis under the UCCJEA is going to favor the
state court and empower it to dismiss requests for declination in favor of
tribal court jurisdiction. The tribal court may be able to claim temporary
emergency jurisdiction, but it will likely have a difficult time dislodging the
“first in time” state court filing or strict application of residency, and the
state court is likely to ultimately retain continuing jurisdiction.81 Still, the
filing of the order of protection in tribal court and the statutory provisions
regarding simultaneous proceedings should induce communication between
the courts to determine jurisdiction.
Similarly, in the Introduction scenario, finding simultaneous proceed-
ings would invoke mandatory communication with the tribal court.82 In that
situation, the tribal court should easily be able to establish home state juris-
diction given the inability to establish six months off reservation, but con-
cern for the survivor’s safety may warrant declination of tribal court juris-
diction in favor of the state court. Arguably, judicial communication about
declinations and appropriate fora is key to affecting the most survivor-pro-
tective application of the UCCJEA—and to addressing tribal sovereignty
concerns. Judicial communication includes the tribal court in assessing tri-
bal concerns, interests, and perspective as part of the jurisdictional determi-
nation—a counterbalance against state court bias and the worst outcomes of
a purely “first in time” analysis. It also provides the tribal court with a say
in the protection of its tribal members, including the opportunity to honor
the survivor’s forum selection in deference to her safety needs.
Unfortunately, in domestic violence-related custody cases involving
flight across reservation lines, a default “first in time” analysis, the presence
78. But see MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-7-201(3) (2019) (“Physical presence of, or personal jurisdic-
tion over, a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child custody determination.”).
79. See Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2265 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-
259).
80. Leeds, supra note 38, at 360–61.
81. See In re Marriage of Vanlaarhoven, 55 P.3d 942, 945 (Mont. 2002) (holding that an Oregon
district court’s exercise of temporary emergency jurisdiction “did not automatically divest the [Montana]
district court of jurisdiction”).
82. §§ 40-7-107(2), 40-7-135(2). See also Id. § 40-7-139.
13
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or residency of the survivor and child off reservation,83 and the involvement
of a non-Indian parent can too frequently work against the survivor’s auton-
omy and safety in forum selection—even though strategic application of the
UCCJEA might empower them. When tribal jurisdiction is hastily set aside
and judicial communications provisions are not applied to include tribal
courts, case outcomes favoring state court jurisdiction work against tribal
sovereignty and the ability of tribes to protect their members from violence.
However, federal law and Montana state law provide strong support for
tribal jurisdiction and tribal court involvement in jurisdictional determina-
tions in domestic violence-related child custody actions involving Indian
survivors and children.
VI. MONTANA CASE LAW: INFRINGEMENT AND COMITY
A. Infringement
In the event state courts or parties challenge tribal court jurisdiction,
federal and Montana case law indicate tribal jurisdiction in child custody
actions involving Indian children is supported by an infringement analysis
under Williams v. Lee.84
Tribes’ inherent sovereign powers over domestic relations involving
members are a matter of federal precedent. In United States v. Quiver,85
relying on the Nonintercourse Acts, the Supreme Court held it “became the
settled policy of Congress to permit the personal and domestic relations of
the Indians with each other to be regulated . . . according to their tribal
customs and laws.”86 A key modern precedent is Fisher v. District Court of
Sixteenth Judicial District of Montana,87 which regarded disputed jurisdic-
tion between Montana’s Rosebud County and the Northern Cheyenne Tri-
bal Court in a child custody matter. In Fisher, the Supreme Court extended
a Williams infringement analysis to domestic relations involving only tribal
83. But see Id. § 40-7-201(3), which provides that physical presence alone is insufficient to make
an initial jurisdictional claim.
84. 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding federal law and Congressional policy restrict state exercises of
power where they “infringe[ ] on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them”). See also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59–60 (1978) (holding the Indian Civil
Rights Act did not impliedly waive tribal sovereign immunity nor authorize declaratory or injunctive
civil actions against tribes in federal courts; “[W]e must bear in mind that providing a federal forum for
issues arising under [ICRA] constitutes an interference with tribal autonomy and self-government be-
yond that created by the change in substantive law itself.”).
85. 241 U.S. 602 (1916).
86. Id. at 603–04.
87. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
14
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members, holding tribal jurisdiction is exclusive when such matters arise on
the reservation:88
The right of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe to govern itself independently of
state law has been consistently protected by federal statute. . . . State-court
jurisdiction plainly would interfere with the powers of self-government con-
ferred upon the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and exercised through the Tribal
Court. It would subject a dispute arising on the reservation among reserva-
tion Indians to a forum other than the one they have established for them-
selves. As the present record illustrates, it would create a substantial risk of
conflicting adjudications affecting the custody of the child and would cause
a corresponding decline in the authority of the Tribal Court. No federal stat-
ute sanctions this interference with tribal self-government.89
Thus, Fisher also rooted support for tribal court jurisdiction in the federal
policy of tribal self-determination.90
A similar logic informed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Iowa Mutual
Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,91 which recognized “the Federal Government’s
longstanding policy of encouraging tribal self-government” and held, “[t]his
policy reflects the fact that Indian tribes retain ‘attributes of sovereignty
over both their members and their territory . . . .’”92 Citing to Williams, the
Iowa Mutual Court also emphasized that “[t]he federal policy favoring tri-
bal self-government operates even in areas where state control has not been
affirmatively pre-empted by federal statute.”93
The Fisher Court also rejected an equal protection claim regarding tri-
bal member access to state courts, holding that exclusive tribal jurisdiction
stemmed from the “quasi-sovereign status” of tribes and was based upon a
political classification, not a racial one.94
1. On-Reservation Cases
The Montana Supreme Court followed a Williams and Fisher approach
to considering state vs. tribal jurisdiction in the child custody matters in In
88. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Identity and Assimilation: Changing Definitions of Tribal Power
over Children, 83 MINN. L. REV. 927, 949 (1999). See also Wexler, supra note 13, at 622–23 (“While
the Court decided Fisher prior to Montana and Strate, it seems clear that the case falls within Montana’s
internal affairs exception.”).
89. Fisher, 424 U.S. at 386–88.
90. Barbara Ann Atwood, Fighting Over Indian Children: The Uses and Abuses of Jurisdictional
Ambiguity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 1051, 1105 (1989).
91. 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (holding exhaustion of tribal remedies was necessary and that diversity juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 did not apply to tribes).
92. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
93. Id.
94. Atwood, supra note 90, at 1083. See also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (holding
federal Indian preference hiring policies did not violate the anti-discrimination provisions of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act because they were based on political rather than racial classifications and
legitimately furthered federal policies supporting Indian self-governance and self-determination).
15
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re Marriage of Skillen.95 Much as in Scenario 2 above, Skillen involved a
non-Indian father who had filed a petition in state court and a tribal member
mother and child residing on the Fort Peck Reservation. The Montana Su-
preme Court held that tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in custody
cases involving Indian children and at least one Indian parent residing on
reservation.96
Though this case was decided under the precursor to the UCCJEA, the
UCCJA, its articulation of state policy regarding tribal jurisdiction remains
good case law.97 It also supports a membership-based analysis for arguing
for tribal jurisdiction even when tribal member parents and children reside
off reservation.98 Using the same infringement analysis and deference to the
federal self-determination policy found in Fisher, Skillen noted that, though
the ICWA expressly excludes dissolution from its provisions, its purposes
and principles provide support for the assertion that child custody determi-
nations involving Indian children are vital to the security and integrity of
tribes.99 Recognizing state court unfamiliarity with tribal cultural considera-
tions, the Skillen court also found that tribal courts are better equipped to
consider “the child’s ethnic and cultural identity.”100 Additionally, it con-
sidered the purposes of the PKPA and UCCJA, recognizing, “The two laws
make clear that jurisdictional disputes over custody are not in the best inter-
est of the child.”101
Skillen’s infringement-preemption analysis tracks with current Mon-
tana law regarding whether a state court may exercise jurisdiction on reser-
vation. In In re Estate of Big Spring,102 the Montana Supreme Court held
that state courts must apply the Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker103 test of
“two independent but related barriers” in determining state vs. tribal juris-
95. 956 P.2d 1, 14 (Mont. 1998) (overruled by In re Estate of Big Spring, 255 P.3d 121 (Mont.
2011)).
96. Id. at 17.
97. See In the Matter of S.B.C., 340 P.3d 534, 545 (Mont. 2014) (McGrath, C.J., with Baker and
Shea, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Skillen for the principle that “regardless of the child’s residence, tribal
courts are uniquely and inherently more qualified than state courts to determine custody in the best
interests of an Indian child.”). See also Switzer v. Crow Tribal Courts, No. CV 10–80–BLG–RFC–CSO,
2010 WL 3326870, at *3 n.1 (D. Mont. July 7, 2010) (quoting Skillen for the principle that Montana
courts are “reluctant to suspend the tribal court’s jurisdiction just because a state court may have concur-
rent jurisdiction”).
98. Skillen, 956 P.2d at 18. See also Wexler, supra note 13, at 623 (arguing for “geography-plus”
jurisdiction based on membership supported by Williams non-infringement and John v. Baker, 982 P.2d
738 (Alaska 1999)).
99. Skillen, 956 P.2d at 10–12.
100. Id. at 18 (affirming the requirement in In re Bertelson, 617 P.2d 121 (Mont. 1980), for a district
court hearing to determine “which forum is better equipped to make a determination . . . [about] the
child’s best interests”).
101. Id. at 9.
102. 255 P.3d 121 (Mont. 2011).
103. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
16
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diction. The two factors are “whether the exercise of state jurisdiction or
authority first may be preempted by federal law, or second, may infringe on
tribal self-government.”104 Big Spring held that “if either one is met a state
may not assume civil jurisdiction or take regulatory action over Indian peo-
ple or their territories within the boundaries of their reservations.”105
This is important to note because some state courts may invoke the
Montana v. United States106 subject matter test107 to preclude tribal court
jurisdiction if family members have been residing on non-Indian fee land
within the reservation.108 But the policies of Williams and Iowa Mutual
carried forward in Skillen and Big Spring put child custody cases involving
tribal members solidly within Montana’s general rule, which holds, “tribes
retain their inherent power to determine tribal membership, [and] to regu-
late domestic relations among members.”109 Montana also recognized
tribes’ inherent powers over what is “necessary to protect tribal self-govern-
ment or to control internal relations.”110 Undergirded by the policies in-
forming the ICWA, but also independently recognized under Montana state
law, the vital importance of Indian children’s continued tribal connection
strongly supports tribal interest and tribal court jurisdiction in domestic vio-
lence-related custody determinations. When survivors are located on reser-
vation and petition the tribal court, as in Scenario 2, such considerations
weigh strongly in favor of state court declinations, even if the tribal court
cannot establish home state jurisdiction under a UCCJEA analysis.
104. In re Estate of Big Spring, 255 P.3d 121, 132 (Mont. 2011) (drawing upon Williams and citing
to White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980)). Big Spring overruled the use of the
Iron Bear test applied in Skillen, finding the Iron Bear test erroneously allowed states to retain “residual
jurisdiction” where federal law had not specifically preempted their jurisdiction. Big Spring, 255 P.3d at
131. Again, this signals solid support in Montana case law for tribal jurisdiction in domestic relations
cases involving tribal members. It also indicates a generally strong Montana policy favoring tribal sover-
eignty and self-determination.).
105. Id. at 133.
106. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
107. Id. at 565–66 (“Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate,
through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relation-
ships with the tribe or its members . . . . [citations omitted] A tribe may also retain inherent power to
exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health
or welfare of the tribe.”) (note that under Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 457–58 (1997), the
second Montana exception is construed narrowly).
108. See Garcia v. Gutierrez, 217 P.3d 591, 599–602 (N.M. 2009).
109. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
110. Id.
17
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2. Off-Reservation Cases
Following the principles of Iowa Mutual and the ICWA policies recog-
nizing tribes’ sovereignty interests in Indian children’s welfare, as well as
the fundamental importance of tribal connection to Indian children’s best
interests, Skillen also held that “when an Indian child resides off the reser-
vation, the state court and tribal court share concurrent jurisdiction.”111 Ad-
ditionally, the court upheld the reluctance of In re Bertelson112 to state
courts “automatically assum[ing] jurisdiction.”113 In situations where con-
current jurisdiction applies, Skillen requires that state courts conduct hear-
ings prior to exercising jurisdiction to determine the most appropriate forum
for evaluating the child’s best interests. Such determinations should give
“due consideration to the child’s ethnic and cultural identity” and should be
based on the following factors:
a) the existence of tribal law or tribal customs relating to childcare and cus-
tody,
b) the nature of the child’s personal relationship with caretakers,
c) the child’s assimilation into and adjustment to life in the tribe and on the
reservation,
d) the parents’ ethnic and cultural backgrounds and membership in or ties
to the tribe,
e) the length of the child’s residence both on and off the reservation,
f) the domicile and residence of the parents,
g) the child’s personal relationships with the parents,
h) the contacts of the child and the parents to the tribe and the state,
i) and the tribe’s interest in deciding custody.114
Thus, rejecting hastily made state court jurisdictional assertions, the
court instead required an infringement analysis and signaled a preference
for forum non conveniens and conflict of laws analyses that “respect federal
policy and consider the rights of the child and the tribe in deciding whether
to accept or to decline jurisdiction.”115 This aligns with the embedded
UCCJEA protections for survivors in domestic violence-related custody de-
terminations. And sovereignty considerations argue strongly in favor of tri-
bal jurisdiction when the survivor has chosen a tribal court forum. When a
survivor has selected a state court, communication with the tribal court on
these issues also respects tribal sovereignty and tribes’ involvement in the
protection of their members.
Importantly, the recognition of tribal jurisdiction off reservation under
Skillen expands beyond the standard UCCJEA geographic analysis of juris-
111. In re Marriage of Skillen, 956 P.2d 1, 18 (Mont. 1998).
112. 617 P.2d 121 (Mont. 1980).
113. Id. at 126.
114. Skillen, 956 P.2d at 18 (citing to In re Bertelson, 617 P.2d 121, 130 (Mont. 1980)).
115. Bertelson, 617 P.2d at 126 (emphasis added).
18
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diction, tipping in favor of an ICWA-like member-based analysis. This is
consistent with Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,116 which
held the domicile of children up for adoption was that of their tribal mem-
ber parents, even though the children had never resided on the reserva-
tion.117
It is also of interest that another means of establishing jurisdiction
under the UCCJEA involves a “significant connection” test based on more
than “mere physical presence” if no other “state” can clearly claim jurisdic-
tion.118 Presumably, tribal membership and tribal interests in keeping a
child connected to his/her culture and community should be weighed under
this test. However, given the state court bias addressed above, concern re-
mains that the discretionary assessment of an Indian child’s “significant
connections” to a tribe by a state court may not favor the tribe. If state
courts judge the facts based on non-Indian cultural norms, outcomes under
either a Skillen-Bertelson infringement analysis or a UCCJEA “significant
connections” determination might look more like the “sufficiently Indian”
determinations used in some states to preclude tribal involvement under the
ICWA.
Similarly, and unfortunately, concurrent jurisdiction often tips in favor
of the state court.119 However, a Montana federal district court has sup-
ported the exhaustion of tribal remedies in Indian child custody conflicts,
quoting the Montana general rule: “Indian tribes retain their inherent power
to . . . regulate domestic relations among members.”120 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has also upheld tribal court exhaustion as a matter of
comity in Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court121 and in Atwood
v. Fort Peck Tribal Court Assiniboine.122
116. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
117. Id. at 48–49.
118. Hogan, supra note 4, at 18. See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 40–7–201(1)(b)(i) (2019).
119. See United States ex rel. Cobell v. Cobell, 503 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that a preced-
ing divorce action in state court relinquished tribal court jurisdiction and granting a writ of habeas
corpus to remove children from Blackfeet Tribal Court jurisdiction); Garcia v. Gutierrez, 217 P.3d 591,
608 (N.M. 2009) (holding that “the interests of comity do not outweigh the district court’s independent
obligation to consider the child’s best interests in coming to a custody determination”); Langdeau v.
Langdeau, 751 N.W.2d 722, 730–31 (S.D. 2008) (holding that “first in time” service of process allowed
for state court jurisdiction and that wife was always a resident of the state, even though she also resided
on the reservation); In re S.B.C., 340 P.3d 534, 542 (Mont. 2014) (affirming a district court’s denial of
requested ICWA transfer to Blackfeet Tribal Court because it determined the tribal court request was too
delayed).
120. Switzer v. Crow Tribal Courts, No. CV 10-80-BLG-RFC-CSO, 2010 WL 3326870, at *3 (D.
Mont. July 7, 2010).
121. 566 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2009).
122. 513 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a claim by a child’s non-Indian father of substantive due
process violation stemming from tribal court adjudication of a custody dispute).
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B. Comity and Abstention
Another analysis that frequently informs declination and jurisdiction
decisions is comity, which allows jurisdictions to “honor the laws of other
jurisdictions as a matter of deference and mutual respect under an umbrella
of federal law.”123 The doctrine arises because mandatory enforcement
under the UCCJEA is only invoked if the court issuing the custody determi-
nation “exercised jurisdiction in substantial conformity” with the
UCCJEA.124 Many tribes have not adopted the UCCJEA. However, even if
tribes have not adopted the UCCJEA into their codes, and tribal courts find
it does not apply, concern over state enforcement of child custody determi-
nations under implied principles of comity may influence tribal court deci-
sions and jurisdictional disputes.125 Comity may also be explicitly invoked
to support exclusive or concurrent tribal jurisdiction and to sanction judicial
communication conferences to determine jurisdiction.
For example, in Miles v. Chinle Family Court,126 the Navajo Nation
Supreme Court held that, while the UCCJEA and PKPA did not apply to
tribal court proceedings, Navajo family courts could include a UCCJEA and
PKPA analysis in tribal court custody decisions in order to “buttress their
jurisdiction” under Navajo Code “by demonstrating how the application of
these laws support[ed] Navajo jurisdiction, if deemed necessary to invoke
the mandate to recognize the decision under the UCCJEA.”127
Alternately, in Garcia v. Gutierrez,128 while also finding the PKPA did
not apply to tribes and holding the state court had a duty to retain jurisdic-
tion if no judicial agreement could be found, the New Mexico Supreme
Court held principles of comity supported concurrent state and tribal juris-
diction and urged the district and tribal court toward judicial communica-
123. Leeds, supra note 38, at 333, 340–42 (noting that domestic comity analysis differs from inter-
national comity analysis and that some states have codified comity provisions regarding tribes). See also
Atwood, supra note 88 at 946–50.
124. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40–7–303 (2019). See also Billie v. Stier, 141 So.3d 584, 585 (Fla.
3d. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (holding the state court had jurisdiction because the tribal court “did not sub-
stantially comply with the jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJEA”).
125. Hon. Dennis M. Bear Don’t Walk, Chief Judge, Crow Nation Tribal Court, Remarks to Federal
Indian Law Class at the Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana (Oct. 2020).
In a guest speaker presentation to the Federal Indian Law class at the Alexander Blewett III School of
Law at the University of Montana, Chief Judge Bear Don’t Walk of the Crow Nation Tribal Court
described a judicial communication with an Arizona state court to determine jurisdiction in a child
custody action wherein the tribal court ultimately retained jurisdiction. He commented that the commu-
nication gave him confidence in awarding visitation to the parent in Arizona, knowing that the Arizona
state court would uphold the tribal court order.
126. 7 Am. Tribal Law 608 (Navajo 2008).
127. Id. at 613–14.
128. 217 P.3d 591 (N.M. 2009).
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tions to determine jurisdiction.129 In Carson v. Barham,130 the Colville Tri-
bal Court of Appeals similarly upheld judicial communications conferences
between tribal and state courts as an appropriate procedure for a convenient
forum analysis, despite the inapplicability of the UCCJEA under tribal
law.131
In Montana, as noted in Skillen, district court abstention from exercis-
ing jurisdiction and deference to tribal court exhaustion in jurisdictional
disputes have been upheld as obligations upon the state courts under comity
principles.132 Montana’s doctrine of abstention is grounded in its Williams-
Iowa Mutual infringement and self-determination analysis, as articulated in
In re Marriage of Limpy:
Sound public policy requires that the Tribal Courts should have the jurisdic-
tion to interpret their Tribal Constitution and Tribal law where the Indian
Tribe has established a functioning forum for themselves to adjudicate con-
troversies affecting the custody of their children. There is no basis for the
State to assume jurisdiction that would interfere with Tribal self-govern-
ment.133
As a result, under Montana law, tribal court exhaustion and state court ab-
stention are explicitly upheld where simultaneous proceedings are at issue
and may be warranted even if a tribal court has not yet exercised its juris-
diction.134
Relying upon comity for enforcement or resolution of declination re-
quests necessarily requires the analysis of jurisdiction and due process. In
Malaterre v. Malaterre,135 holding the tribal court had jurisdiction over a
dissolution and custody determination and upholding a motion to dismiss in
a subsequent state action, the North Dakota Supreme Court elucidated:
[B]efore comity may be relied upon it is necessary to establish that the court
which issued the order or judgment had jurisdiction over the matter and the
parties involved and that due process was afforded to the parties in the pro-
ceedings. If the court is without jurisdiction (at least while mother and child
reside on the reservation) then one of the basic requisites, i.e., jurisdiction,
would be missing and consequently comity would no longer apply. Further-
more, it appears that due process would be lacking under such situation.136
129. Id. at 607.
130. 2003 WL 25907717, *4 (Colville C.A. 2003).
131. Cited in Tupling v. Kruse, 15 Am. Tribal Law 23, 27 (Colville C.A. 2017).
132. In re Marriage of Skillen, 956 P.2d 1, 14 (Mont. 1998) (citing to In re Marriage of Limpy, 636
P.2d 266 (Mont. 1981); Montana ex rel. Stewart v. District Court, 609 P.2d 290 (Mont. 1980)).
133. Limpy, 636 P.2d at 269.
134. See Nielsen v. Brocksmith Land & Livestock, Inc., 88 P.3d 1269, 1272 (Mont. 2004) (holding
the district court had not erred in abstaining given pending adjudication in the Fort Peck Tribal Court
and noting, “In Limpy, we abstained despite the fact that the tribal court had not yet exercised jurisdic-
tion over the specific case on appeal, because the tribal court had exercised jurisdiction in similar cases
which indicated ‘a disposition to preempt State jurisdiction.’”).
135. 293 N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1980).
136. Id. at 145.
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Both Malaterre and Garcia also noted that the full faith and credit
provision of the United States Constitution, Art. IV, § 1, only applies to
states and was not binding on tribal courts as to state court judgments.137
In the inverse, Wilson v. Marchington138 held that, as tribes were not
explicitly included in the U.S. Constitutional full faith and credit provision,
“the Constitution itself does not afford full faith and credit to Indian tribal
judgments.”139 In the absence of applicable full faith and credit provisions,
Wilson therefore relied upon a comity analysis as the exception to the “gen-
eral principle [that] federal courts should recognize and enforce tribal judg-
ments.”140
Importing the comity analysis from Hilton v. Guyot,141 the Wilson
court held that the two mandatory considerations were whether: “(1) the
tribal court did not have both personal and subject matter jurisdiction; or (2)
the defendant was not afforded due process of law.”142 As a result, due
process and jurisdiction are common objections raised when tribal court
jurisdiction is disputed in Indian child custody actions.
Given all of the above, it is imperative to tribal member survivor
safety, tribal sovereignty, and the intent and purposes of the UCCJEA that
tribal courts are full participants in jurisdictional analyses in domestic vio-
lence-related child custody actions. Further, in Montana, such integration is
a legal obligation of state courts. However, as tribes consider protections for
tribal member survivors, it is incredibly important to note that in Fisher, it
was dispositive that the tribe had an ordinance establishing tribal jurisdic-
tion, and that the enactment of such tribal ordinance was authorized by the
Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476.143 This provided the Court
with a preemption analysis that defeated state jurisdiction.144
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Cobell v. Cobell,145 the fact that the
Blackfeet Tribal Code deferred to state law in the area of domestic relations
and disclaimed tribal jurisdiction allowed the Ninth Circuit to find the tribal
137. Id. at 144; Garcia v. Gutierrez, 217 P.3d 591, 603–05 (N.M. 2009) (also analyzing whether the
PKPA applied to tribes or required full faith and credit and holding it did not).
138. 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
139. Id. at 808.
140. Id. at 810.
141. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
142. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 810 (also citing four discretionary factors: “(1) the judgment was obtained
by fraud; (2) the judgment conflicts with another final judgment that is entitled to recognition; (3) the
judgment is inconsistent with the parties’ contractual choice of forum; or (4) recognition of the judg-
ment, or the cause of action upon which it is based, is against the public policy of the United States or
the forum state in which recognition of the judgment is sought”).
143. Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of Mont., 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976).
144. Id.
145. 503 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974).
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court had relinquished its jurisdiction of the case.146 Later, in In re Mar-
riage of Wellman,147 the Montana Supreme Court alternately held the inclu-
sion of state law in Blackfeet Tribal Code did not cede jurisdiction but was
merely a choice of law.148 However, it is obvious that when tribal codes
explicitly limit tribal courts’ jurisdiction, states have stronger claims to ju-
risdiction.149
Unfortunately, gaps and limitations in the jurisdictional provisions of
tribal codes are not uncommon, as “[t]he codes of many tribes were not
drafted to resolve jurisdictional disputes with other sovereigns . . . [and]
may be silent as to the jurisdictional basis for child custody determinations
. . . .”150 This is important to address, not only for the exercise of tribal
jurisdiction in clear cases, but also under the UCCJEA declination frame-
work and comity principles.
VII. CHALLENGES: PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND DUE PROCESS
As has been noted, while the UCCJEA and PKPA address subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, a non-Indian parent may also raise the issue of personal
jurisdiction in tribal court, particularly if they reside off reservation. Here,
as elsewhere, tribal code ordinances may be a help or a hindrance. For in-
stance, establishing personal jurisdiction that withstands a state court com-
ity analysis may not be possible for off-reservation parties if the code does
not sufficiently address service of process or include a long-arm provision.
As an example, in Freund v. Pearson,151 the tribal appellate court noted the
trial court had “based its personal jurisdiction . . . on the hearing notice and
petition to appellant by certified mail, his appearance by legal counsel, his
appearance in requesting a continuance in the matter, and the tribal enroll-
ment and domiciles of appellee and her children. It could have also consid-
ered . . . the Tribe’s long-arm statute as a basis for jurisdiction . . . .”152
In Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance,153 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld personal civil jurisdiction over a
non-Indian in tribal court, finding it sufficient that “he was served with
tribal process at the Water Wheel location on tribal land . . . .”154 The court
also offered that, “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defen-
146. Id. at 795.
147. 852 P.2d 559 (Mont. 1993).
148. Id. at 561–62.
149. Wexler, supra note 13, at 651.
150. Atwood, supra note 88, at 967.
151. 1989 Colville App. LEXIS 1, 1 CCAR 29 (Colville C.A. 1989).
152. Id. at 37.
153. 642 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2011).
154. Id. at 819.
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dant where that defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
state such that the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’”155 To be noted, in Water Wheel, the defendant’s on-
going lease of tribal land and residency and business operations within the
reservation for two decades also supported the tribal court’s assertion of
personal jurisdiction.156
However, if a tribe is exercising Special Domestic Violence Criminal
Jurisdiction, this might also be raised as a counter to personal jurisdiction
challenges in domestic violence-related cases. As authorized by federal law
under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), Special Domestic Vio-
lence Criminal Jurisdiction authorizes tribal jurisdiction over defendants
who are spouses or intimate or dating partners of tribal members, even if
non-Indians.157 Interestingly, some stalking and intimidation crimes enu-
merate internet-based offenses, and use of means such as social media to
harass or threaten survivors residing on reservation may also be found to
establish the minimum contacts needed for exercise of personal jurisdiction
over abusers under a constitutional analysis.158 Analogizing to VAWA ju-
risdiction also implicates the scope of Indian country jurisdiction under 18
U.S.C. § 1151.159 Because § 1151 provides that Indian country includes
“all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent,
and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation,” it may also
preclude subject matter jurisdiction challenges based on fee status under the
Montana test. Tribal courts that have been authorized to exercise Special
Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction also have the added advantage of
already having structures in place to satisfy heightened due process scrutiny
under the VAWA and the Indian Civil Rights Act.160
Additionally, in terms of personal jurisdiction, it has been suggested
that consensual familial relationships with a tribal member provide notice
of possible tribal jurisdiction over child custody matters.161 For example,
see supra discussion of Freund, wherein the tribal enrollment of the mother
and children, as well as their domicile, supported a finding of personal ju-
155. Id. at 820 (citing to Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
156. Id.
157. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B) (2018).
158. See Jessica Miles, We Are Never Ever Getting Back Together: Domestic Violence Victims,
Defendants, and Due Process, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 141, 161–62 (Oct. 2013).
159. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3).
160. See Jordan Gross, Through a Federal Habeas Corpus Glass, Darkly—Who Is Entitled to Effec-
tive Assistance of Counsel in Tribal Court Under ICRA and How Will We Know If They Got It?, 42 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 43–46 (for a review of the additional procedural protections beyond those required by
ICRA’s general provisions).
161. Atwood, supra note 90, at 1105.
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risdiction. Still, in In Re: Marriage of Redfox,162 the Crow Nation Appellate
Court relied on the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court’s finding of personal
jurisdiction based primarily on the tribal member parent’s residency and
service upon the nonmember parent in upholding that court’s jurisdiction
under principles of comity.163
Importantly, the UCCJEA itself indicates that personal jurisdiction is
not a requirement for determining child custody actions covered by the
Act.164 However, Troxel v. Granville165 provides for constitutional protec-
tion of a parent’s fundamental rights to “make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control” of their children as a liberty interest under sub-
stantive due process.166 Similarly, Montana state law provides statutory
protection for parental rights.167 Because of the scrutiny tribal courts face,
substantial conformity with the UCCJEA on personal jurisdiction in this
sense may be insufficient to withstand substantive due process challenges—
particularly in ex parte custody determinations.168 As noted by the Navajo
Supreme Court in the Miles case, “Custody of children is such an important
issue that only in the direst of circumstances involving the safety of the
child should a family court remove a child from the custody of a parent
without the opportunity for that parent to respond to the petition before the
removal.”169
Despite the attention that survivors’ advocates and tribal courts may
need to give these concerns in order to uphold exercises of tribal court juris-
diction, ultimately general fears about due process violations in tribal courts
appear to be overblown. In a survey of multiple tribal court decisions, Mat-
thew L.M. Fletcher found, “in each case it appear[ed] that the tribal court
sought to provide stronger guarantees of fundamental fairness under tribal
law than would have been available in applying American jurisprudence in
162. 2001 CROW 13 (Crow Ct. App. 2001).
163. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 40, 46.
164. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-7-201(3) (2019). See also Miles, supra note 158, at 171–73 (analyzing
the open question of the plurality opinion in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) and the applicability
of “status exceptions”; also quoting the Wisconsin Supreme Court: “[r]equiring minimum contacts
would often make termination of parental rights and the subsequent adoption proceedings impractical or
impossible”); Wexler, supra note 13, at 647–48 (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction is no longer a prerequisite to
judicial action in many child custody proceedings.”).
165. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
166. Id. at 65, 72.
167. See § 40-4-227, which also provides that parental interests yield to the best interests of the
child.
168. See also United States ex rel. Cobell v. Cobell, 503 F.2d 790, 793–95 (9th Cir. 1974) (uphold-
ing a writ of habeas corpus and noting a lack of remedy in the tribal court based on an ex parte re-
straining order that was without invitation to appear).
169. Miles v. Chinle Family Court, 7 Am. Tribal Law 608, 614–15 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2008) (holding
that due process was not violated, but strongly relying upon the fact that the ex parte custody order was
not the only custody order).
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the areas of due process and equal protection.”170 Also, as per Louise
Erdich: “Tribal judges know they must make impeccable decisions. They
know they are being watched closely and must defend their hard-won juris-
diction . . . .”171 However, these types of challenges to tribal jurisdiction are
precisely what Indian survivors face when selecting tribal court jurisdiction
for their domestic violence-related child custody actions against non-Indian
abusers.
As a result, tribes must carefully attend to their tribal codes and have
difficult decisions to make when considering whether to adopt model code
language. Explicit conformity with state laws and state court expectations
shores up tribal court jurisdiction and orders against challenges. However, it
also runs the risk of diminishing jurisdiction over members living off reser-
vation, if adopted code provisions adhere to strictly geographic or territorial
jurisdiction. This has implications for domestic violence survivor protection
and safety, including the ability for survivors to successfully request state
court declinations in favor of tribal court jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.
VIII. APPLICATION OF THE LAWS
Under Montana case precedent, what might the current state of the law
look like in practice? In Scenario 1, the survivor at the shelter in a nearby
metropolitan area may still want her tribal court to adjudicate her child cus-
tody matter. In Montana, given Skillen and Fisher, the tribal court has, at
the least, concurrent jurisdiction over her claim because of her and the
child’s tribal membership. Following Bertelson, Big Spring, and Limpy, as
well as the provisions of the UCCJEA, the nearby state court where her
partner has filed should decline jurisdiction. The reservation is clearly the
“home state” in this instance. She might also avail herself of an inconve-
nient forum claim or change of venue request if she wishes to pursue adju-
dication in the state district court nearest to her shelter.172
In Scenario 2, where the survivor flees onto the reservation after living
off reservation with her non-Indian partner, again, given the concurrent ju-
risdiction over Indian child custody matters recognized by Skillen and the
deference to tribal courts’ interests and appropriateness in determining child
custody issues in Bertelson, there is strong support for upholding tribal ju-
risdiction. Under the Montana abstention and tribal court exhaustion doc-
170. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Courts and Fundamental Fairness: Indian Courts and the Fu-
ture Revisited, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 59, 91 (2013).
171. Louise Erdrich, Op-Ed, Rape on the Reservation, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2013), https://
perma.cc/52JD-L5SZ.
172. See In re C.M.R., 372 P.3d 1275, 1277 (Mont. 2016) (citing to § 40–4–211(4)(a)(ii) for the
principle that “Parenting Plan proceedings are commenced ‘in the county in which the child is a perma-
nent resident or found’”).
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trines, the state court should stay its proceedings. The simultaneous pro-
ceedings invoke mandatory judicial communication with the tribal court to
determine jurisdiction. Analogous to the Miles case decided by the Navajo
Supreme Court, it is likely the tribal court can establish continuing jurisdic-
tion.
In the Introduction scenario, Montana law provides concurrent juris-
diction; however, the reservation is the home state. Under Nielsen v. Brock-
smith Land & Livestock,173 Montana state courts are “open to all Montana
citizens, including . . . Indian citizens [citation omitted], [and] [a]s such,
Native Americans may sue in state court so long as Congress has not ex-
pressly retained jurisdiction in the United States, particularly if the Native
American is a Montana citizen and the matter does not interfere with self-
government.”174 Yet, the potential simultaneous proceedings and the in-
fringement, abstention, and tribal court exhaustion doctrines necessitate ju-
dicial communications with the tribal court.
As shown, Montana case law supplements the state’s statutory
UCCJEA provisions to provide strong support for tribal member survivors
to argue for tribal jurisdiction in their domestic violence-related child cus-
tody actions, regardless of their abuser’s non-Indian status or their resi-
dency off reservation. Montana law also clearly provides for state court
selection if such should be a more convenient or safer forum. Additionally,
if judicial communications provisions are faithfully applied to include tribal
courts, Montana’s adoption of the UCCJEA does not per se exist in tension
with tribal sovereignty, even if tribes have not adopted the model code.
Involvement of tribal courts in emergency jurisdiction determinations facili-
tates tribal sovereignty interests in protecting tribal member survivors.
Thus, in Montana, clear tribal civil jurisdictional assertions in child
custody actions have the weight of state case law precedent, Supreme Court
jurisprudence, and federal and state policy in their favor. Tribes can further
buttress this authority with careful attention to particular tribal code provi-
sions. However, tribes in states where case law is less deferential to tribal
sovereignty may find the adoption of the model code to be a stronger tool
for jurisdictional recognition.
IX. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO GAPS
Ultimately, Deer and Tatum identify jurisdictional gaps and resource
issues as the limitations to “the ability of tribal governments to adequately
protect all women in accordance with their customs, traditions, and contem-
173. 88 P.3d 1269 (Mont. 2004).
174. Id. at 1272.
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porary judicial interventions.”175 Addressing such gaps via tribal code con-
structions supports tribal sovereignty and the intervention of tribes on be-
half of their members.
Yet, tribes should carefully weigh verbatim model code adoption.
Model code adoption may greatly impact exercises of tribal sovereignty in
that, to the extent it mirrors state law, it may undercut tribal customary and
traditional law. Given the importance of children and families to cultural
integrity and tribal sovereignty, the adjudication of family law issues ac-
cording to custom and tradition is of paramount concern. As noted by the
Crow Nation Appellate Court in the Redfox case:
In the context of competing jurisdictional claims in domestic relations cases
. . . Tribal affiliation is fundamentally different than the relationship that
parents and their children have with a State in which they happen to reside
at any given time. Of all the areas in which Tribal self-government is desira-
ble, the ability to apply the Tribe’s customs and traditions in divorce and
custody proceedings involving Tribal-member children is certainly among
the most important.176
While a tribe’s adoption of the UCCJEA may provide for straightfor-
ward “substantial conformity”177 of tribal law to the Act and state law,
thereby bolstering order enforcement and deference to tribal court jurisdic-
tion, the effects to tribal law warrant keen consideration.
A. A Tribal UCCJEA Solution
Arguably, adoption of UCCJEA provisions into tribal codes provides a
strong basis for recognition of tribal jurisdiction when faced with compet-
ing state court jurisdiction. In fact, the UCCJEA contemplates this in § 104,
the comment noting that “a Tribe could adopt this Act as enabling legisla-
tion by simply replacing references to ‘this State’ with ‘this Tribe.’”178
However, there is also a strong tribal sovereignty argument to be made
against further colonization of tribal codes. Further incorporation of state
and federal laws into tribal codes to make them look more like non-Indian
jurisprudence for the comfort of state and federal court systems undermines
tribal sovereignty and cultural preservation by moving tribes away from the
application of customary and traditional law to legal standards imposed by
the dominant culture—a kind of legal assimilation.179 Even more threaten-
175. Sarah Deer and Melissa Tatum, Tribal Efforts to Comply with VAWA’s Full Faith and Credit
Requirements: A Response to Sandra Schmeider, 39 TULSA L. REV. 403, 418 (2003).
176. In re Marriage of Redfox, 2001 CROW 13, ¶ 41 (Crow. Ct. App. 2001).
177. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 104(c); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-
7-135(3).
178. Cmt., UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 104 (1997).
179. Atwood, supra note 88, at 978–79 (citing Pommersheim for the principle that replicating state
courts would complete the process of colonization and eradicate the cultural legal traditions of tribes).
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ing is when, as in Cobell, some courts read jurisdictional cessions into tribal
codes that appear to wholly to defer to state law.
Additionally, succumbing to the strictly geographic interpretations of
subject matter jurisdiction promulgated by the UCCJEA means tribes would
forgo any membership-based analysis and potential ability to exercise juris-
diction beyond reservation borders for the protection of their members
under Skillen and Bertelson.180 “While compliance with the UCCJEA guar-
antees that states will grant full faith and credit to tribal decrees, it also
means that tribes cannot exercise jurisdiction beyond what the UCCJEA
permits.”181
Further, reliance on a geographic analysis of tribal jurisdiction may
result in the diminishment of tribal jurisdiction if reservation boundaries are
diminished.182
B. A Tribal Code Solution
Alternately, tribes could strengthen the jurisdictional provisions in
their tribal codes to more explicitly assert their sovereignty interests in and
jurisdiction over survivors and children involved in domestic violence-re-
lated and other child custody actions. The current moment, given federal
recognition of the MMIW crisis and the potential Congressional
reauthorization of VAWA—including stronger provisions for the protection
of children—provides a platform for tribes to argue interests in and jurisdic-
tion over domestic violence-related civil matters. In the current climate,
tribes’ assertions of jurisdiction based on the protection of tribal members
theoretically have more potential to invoke deference from state courts
under federal policy, preemption, and infringement doctrines. The Tribal
Law and Policy Institute has observed that, “When drafting . . . civil juris-
diction section[s], tribes can assert the inherent powers of the tribe with
strong, broad language . . . . Domestic violence victims can fall through the
‘cracks’ if tribal law does not strongly assert tribal sovereignty.”183 The
guide offers the following example from the Ninilchik Village Tribal Code:
The personal and subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribal Court of Ninilchik
Village under this ordinance is based on the Tribe’s inherent authority over
its members, Tribal internal affairs and those who enter into consensual do-
mestic relationships with Tribal members. The Court’s jurisdiction extends
to all persons residing within the tribe’s geographic service area for the de-
180. See Wexler, supra note 32, at 632.
181. Id.
182. See DeCoteau v. District Cty. Ct. for the Tenth Judicial Dist., 420 U.S. 425 (1975) (finding that
because the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation in South Dakota was terminated, the state courts had
jurisdiction over a child custody determination because the actions arose on non-Indian lands).
183. Guide for Drafting or Revising Victim-Centered Tribal Laws Against Domestic Violence, TRI-
BAL LAW AND POLICY INST. 42 (Feb. 2015), https://perma.cc/9FZG-2STJ.
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livery of federal programs who are Tribal members of Ninilchik Village.
The Court’s jurisdiction also extends to any other person who resides within
the Tribe’s geographic service area who consents to the jurisdiction of the
court. Persons who on or after the date this ordinance is adopted enter into
or remain in a marriage or other similar consensual, personal relationship
with a tribal member shall be deemed to have consented to the Court’s juris-
diction under this ordinance as long as they reside within the Tribe’s geo-
graphic service area. As used in this ordinance, the Tribe’s geographic ser-
vice area does not necessarily describe ‘Indian country.’ Instead, the term
‘geographic service area’ is used in this ordinance to further define those
persons over whom the Tribal Court asserts personal and subject matter ju-
risdiction because of their domestic relations as or with tribal members and
the Tribe’s inherent authority to control its internal relationships even
outside ‘Indian Country.’184
Creating tribally based assertions of jurisdiction also has the added benefit
of addressing potential separation of powers issues when tribal courts de-
cide jurisdiction based upon court-made doctrines in the absence of tribal
law.185 As noted above, tribes should also attend to their personal jurisdic-
tion code provisions.
In Montana, the Bertelson factors specifically weigh “the existence of
tribal law or tribal customs relating to child care and custody” and “the
tribe’s interest in deciding custody” in appropriate forum analyses where
concurrent state and tribal jurisdiction exists.186 Likewise, Limpy contem-
plates the purview of tribal law under state court abstention and declination
analyses.187 Given Montana case law, and considering comity principles
and potential due process and personal jurisdiction challenges to tribal juris-
diction, tribes should evaluate their codes for the following:188
1) Clear statements about the tribe’s interests in child custody determina-
tions;
2) Clear statements about the tribe’s interests in protecting tribal members
from domestic violence;
3) Specific provisions addressing childcare and custody that incorporate
customary and traditional law or reference the importance of tribal cus-
tomary and traditional law to domestic relations matters;
4) Clear assertions of broad jurisdiction over tribal members and children in
whom the tribe claims an interest;
5) Long-arm and service of process provisions that facilitate assertions of
personal jurisdiction, potentially including clear assertions that consen-
184. Id. at 45–46.
185. See Tupling v. Kruse, 15 Am. Tribal Law 23, 28–39 (Colville C.A. 2017) (Bass, J., dissenting).
186. In re Marriage of Skillen, 956 P.2d 1, 18 (Mont. 1998) (citing to In re Bertelson, 617 P.2d 121,
130 (Mont. 1980)).
187. In re Marriage of Limpy, 636 P.2d 266, 269 (Mont. 1981).
188. This section provides a brief review of the tribal codes of Montana tribes for reference only.
Any tribe seeking to revise its code should undertake a thorough code analysis to determine the legal
effect of revisions.
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sual familial relationships with tribal members provide notice of tribal
jurisdiction.
For better or worse, the tribes located in Montana have various pieces
of federal and state or model statutes incorporated into their codes.189 The
Northern Cheyenne Tribal Code includes an inconvenient forum provision
and provides for a UCCJA-style analysis that emphasizes home state and
best interest of child analyses for appropriate forum determination.190 How-
ever, absent an emergency jurisdiction provision, the Code’s simultaneous
proceedings provision contemplates judicial communications only in that
concurrent context.191 Its declination provision also only contemplates dec-
linations for bad conduct—specifically, the wrongful removal of child from
another jurisdiction by a parent.192
The Crow Tribal Code clearly asserts the authority of tribal custom
and tradition in the adjudication of all matters.193 It also includes specific
domestic violence provisions that clearly state the importance of children
and families to the Tribe’s integrity and the interests of the Tribe in domes-
tic violence matters.194 Its child custody provisions track with the UCCJEA
in that they include declination and emergency jurisdiction provisions.195
However, the Code does not contain a judicial communications provision.
The Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribal Code asserts jurisdiction
in child custody actions where at least one party is Indian and at least one
party resided on the reservation for 90 days immediately preceding the ac-
tion.196 The Crow, Northern Cheyenne, and Chippewa Cree codes have
similar 90-day residency requirements for tribal jurisdiction over dissolu-
tions.197 Notably, the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck exercise
Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction under the VAWA and
were one of the pilot tribes.198 As such, assertions of tribal court jurisdiction
189. All tribal codes referenced can be found at the National Indian Law Library’s Tribal Law
Gateway, https://narf.org/nill/triballaw/index.html. See also State of Montana, Montana Indian Law,
http://indianlaw.mt.gov/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2021).
190. NORTHERN CHEYENNE TRIBAL CODE, §§ 8–3–1, 8–4–5 (1998). See also Ronald W. Nelson,
UCCJA – UCCJEA Comparison Section-By-Section 7-8 (2009), https://perma.cc/LT7R-WPPL (noting
that, unlike the UCCJEA, the UCCJA did not include provisions specifically recognizing tribal courts.
This may have influenced tribes’ adoption of its provisions.).
191. NORTHERN CHEYENNE TRIBAL CODE, § 8–4–4.
192. Id. § 8–4–6.
193. CROW TRIBAL CODE, § 3–1–104 (2005).
194. Id. § 8E.1.01(j)–(l).
195. Id. § 10–1–130(1)(c)(ii), (d).
196. FORT PECK ASSINIBOINE AND SIOUX TRIBAL CODE, §§ 301, 304a (2004).
197. CROW TRIBAL CODE, § 10–1–115(1)(a); NORTHERN CHEYENNE TRIBAL CODE, § 8–2–1(A)(1);
CHIPPEWA CREE TRIBAL CODE, § 5–3–3.1(1) (1987).
198. United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Montana, Montana Tribes Selected as Pilot
Project for Prosecuting Domestic Violence Crimes, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Mar. 10, 2015), https://
perma.cc/W332-J563.
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in domestic violence-related child custody actions involving members of
the Fort Peck Tribes could potentially reference the Code’s domestic vio-
lence criminal provisions for claims to tribal interests and analogous juris-
diction in such matters.
The Blackfeet Tribe has an extensive Family Code governing its Fam-
ily Court that clearly states the Tribe’s interests in families and children, as
well as in protecting tribal members from abuse.199 The Code also includes
a provision recognizing the application of tribal custom and tradition to
matters before the Family Court.200 However, as noted in Cobell and Well-
man, the Blackfeet Code references Montana state law with regard to mar-
riage and divorce.201
The Chippewa Cree Tribal Code asserts jurisdiction over children
domiciled or residing within the tribal court’s jurisdiction, and also “if it is
in the best interest of the child that the Tribal Court assume jurisdiction.”202
Like the Blackfeet Tribal Code, the Fort Belknap Indian Community
Tribal Code has an extensive Family Court Act. The Fort Belknap Tribal
Code contains strong clear statements regarding the Tribes’ interests in ad-
judicating matters involving the Tribes’ children: “The young people of the
Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes are the Tribes’ most important re-
sources and their welfare is of paramount importance to the Tribes.”203 The
code also recognizes the application of tribal custom and tradition,204 and
clearly states the Tribes’ interests in the preservation and strength of the
Tribes’ children’s “cultural and Tribal identity.”205 At its outset, the Fort
Belknap Family Code also claims exclusive, original jurisdiction over child
custody actions.206 However, its specific child custody provision incorpo-
rates a UCCJA-style analysis similar to that of the Northern Cheyenne Tri-
bal Code.207
The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (CSKT) Tribal Code has
a nearly identical statement regarding the Tribes’ interest in the Tribes’
children to the Fort Belknap Tribal Code.208 The CSKT Code also includes
a strong statement of intent to incorporate “to the fullest extent possible”
applicable tribal custom and tradition in adjudication of matters involving
199. BLACKFEET TRIBE FAMILY CODE, Ch. 1, Sec. 1, §§ 1–2 (1999).
200. Id. Ch. 1, Sec. 1, § 5.
201. United States ex rel. Cobell v. Cobell, 503 F.2d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 1974); In re Marriage of
Wellman, 852 P.2d 559, 561–62 (Mont. 1993); BLACKFEET TRIBE FAMILY CODE, Ch. 11, Sec. 1–2.
202. CHIPPEWA CREE TRIBAL CODE, § 5–3–3.8.
203. FORT BELKNAP INDIAN COMMUNITY TRIBAL CODE, § 5-1-1(A) (1999).
204. Id. § 5–1–1(C).
205. Id. § 5–1–1(D).
206. Id. § 5–2–2.1.
207. Id. § 5–2–2.2.
208. CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI TRIBAL CODE, § 3–2–101 (2000) (as revised in 2003).
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Indian children.209 The CSKT Code may go farthest in resisting default to
UCCJA-like code provisions in that its Domestic Relations chapter does not
have a specific provisions about child custody actions.210
In Montana, tribal court expertise in tribal custom and tradition is held
to be a necessity in determining the best interests of Indian children.211
Thus, potential opportunities exist to draft tribal code provisions that clearly
assert broader exercises of jurisdiction over tribal members in child custody
actions while protecting tribal codes from cultural dilution. Close reconsid-
eration of tribal codes in light of the solid possibilities for recognition of
tribal court jurisdiction over domestic violence-related child custody actions
also supports survivors. And, in some instances, tribal codes asserting clear
and explicit interests in cultural preservation and the safety and protection
of tribal members may provide for stronger jurisdictional recognition than
the partial incorporation of federal and state provisions.
X. CONCLUSION
In recognition of modern mobility and in response to confusion in the
courts, the purposes of the UCCJEA and its antecedent, the PKPA, were to
reduce forum shopping and to standardize forum determination in child cus-
tody actions in order to support better enforcement.212 Yet, when model
code drafting appears to address application to tribes as an afterthought, it
leaves significant gaps in its legislation and, arguably, perpetuates assimila-
tionist promulgations of law which fail to recognize tribes as third sover-
eigns in the federalist system. While addressing tribal nations in a standard-
ized way is undesirable, as each tribal nation’s history and applicable laws
present a unique set of circumstances, at the least, it would be helpful for
model code drafters to deal more explicitly and specifically with tribal sov-
ereignty and government-to-government relationships in their code drafting
and revisions. As this paper has outlined, when state courts apply model
codes without deference to tribal sovereignty, it contravenes the federal pol-
icy of self-determination and generates inter-governmental friction, to the
cost of both Indian and non-Indian citizens. Alternately, faithful application
of judicial communications statutory provisions helps to strengthen cooper-
ation between state and tribal courts and to address such conflicts.
209. Id. § 3–2–102.
210. See Id. Title III, Chapter 1, Part 1. Note that the Children’s Code excludes divorce actions.
CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI TRIBAL CODE, § 3–2–105(3).
211. See In the Matter of S.B.C., 340 P.3d 534, 545 (Mont. 2014).
212. See Stoneman v. Drollinger, 64 P.3d 997, 1000 (Mont. 2003). See also Barbara Aaby, Under-
standing the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, AMER. J. OF FAM. L. Spring, 2009, at
11.
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State courts are not immune to the quandaries that currently attend
determining subject matter jurisdiction when survivors flee across reserva-
tion lines and domestic violence-related child custody issues are initiated. In
Garcia v. Gutierrez, the New Mexico Supreme Court’s struggle to unequiv-
ocally answer the jurisdictional questions surrounding application of the
UCCJEA and PKPA led it to seeming exasperation: “Where does this leave
the question of tribal jurisdiction? We are unable, in the absence of congres-
sional guidance, to make any final determination as to that issue.”213
Similarly, in Billie v. Stier, a case before Florida’s Third District Court
of Appeal, the presiding justice provided a footnote of personal commen-
tary which lamented:
[T]he statutes in question appear to almost ignore the authority of Native
American tribes over their citizens and seem to ignore the explicit federal
statutes and case law setting forth strong tribal interest in determinations
regarding custody of Native American children. . . . The conflicts within the
statutes are for Congress to resolve, but unfortunately this and other courts
must grapple with the uncertainties of the statutes until such time as Con-
gress acts.214
Arguably, balancing the interests of tribal sovereignty and survivor empow-
erment and safety might be better served by the added certainty and in-
creased predictability of a more substantial congressional jurisdictional
framework. In the meantime, a blanket recommendation that tribes adopt
legislation incorporating the UCCJEA into their tribal codes undermines
tribal sovereignty by further colonizing tribal law. An alternative recom-
mendation that better serves to advocate for tribal sovereignty is for tribes
to analyze their procedural, jurisdictional, domestic violence, and family
law codes with an eye to how they do or don’t provide for civil jurisdiction
over domestic relations proceedings and do or don’t address the emergency
scenarios examined above. Tribes might then consider enacting legislation
that is tailored to respect the tribe’s customs and traditions and to reflect the
tribe’s desires to protect tribal member children and domestic violence sur-
vivors in child custody actions through domestic violence-specific provi-
sions, expanded member-based jurisdictional provisions, emergency juris-
diction provisions, and other recommendations as examined herein.
213. 217 P.3d 591, 607 (N.M. 2009).
214. 141 So.3d 584, 587 n. 1 (Fla. 3d. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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